allow for 'disaffected, refractory, silly, satanic, or punk' agents, that is, those who desire things under negative characterizations, for example, the purely self-destructive.
2 (Or at least we might want to deny that these are rational agents.) Nevertheless, we might prefer an account that allows for a range of positive characterizations under which things can be desired besides that of the overall best.
In rough outline, these are some of the main reasons that Plato's middle-period position has seemed to display a clear gain in psychological realism and subtlety. And I do think that Plato's middle-and late-period views on akrasia embody important psychological and philosophical advances. But here I want to call attention to and discuss one aspect of Plato's earlier views whose interest and subtlety have not, I think, been suffi ciently appreciated. On the Protagoras account of apparent akratic action, although I think that I am being overcome by pleasure, I am, in fact, pursuing my overall good; it is just the case that my judgment is mistaken because I have overvalued short-term goods. What is, I think, especially interesting about this explanation is that on it the person's mind is opaque to herself. She thinks that when she chose the wrong action she was pursuing pleasure, but in fact she was acting on a (mistaken) judgment about and desire for what is overall best. In a deep sense, the person does not know her own mind.
Let me begin with three preliminary observations. First, Plato's theory in the Protagoras may be reminiscent of the claim that he makes about desire and the good in the Gorgias and the Meno. Is the Protagoras theory simply an outcome of the claims in the Gorgias and Meno? Although there are surely important similarities among the three dialogues, the Protagoras position, at least on fi rst examination, is suffi ciently distinct to merit its own investigation. To see this, consider two immediate apparent differences from the Gorgias. First, on one interpretation of the Gorgias (or at least on one interpretation of Gorg. 466a-468e), Plato there claims that all that we want or desire is the actual good or best.
3
So if something is not actually best for us overall, we cannot have the attitude of desire towards it. Plato certainly does not endorse this view in the Protagoras. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the Protagoras attributes the same type of motivational attitude both to the person who goes for what is actually good and to the person who mistakenly goes
